Rationale, aims, and objectives: This paper examines a remarkable dispute between Dutch insurers, hospitals, doctors, and patients about a set of quality indicators. In 2013, private insurers planned to drastically reform Dutch emergency care using quality indicators they had formulated drawing from clinical guidelines, RCTs, and systematic reviews. Insurers' plans caused much debate in the field of emergency care. As quality indicators have come to play a more central role in health care governance, the questions what constitutes good evidence for them, how they ought to be used, and who controls them have become politically and morally charged. This paper is a case study of how a Dutch public knowledge institution, the National Health Care Institute, intervened in this dispute and how they addressed these questions.
| INTRODUCTION
In response to growing demands to achieve cost control, safety, and transparency, quality indicators (or "performance measures") have become increasingly important in the governance of health care. Quality indicators provide a means for care providers, decision makers, and purchasers to measure, compare, and improve the quality of care. [1] [2] [3] Experts agree, both in Dutch context, 4, 5 and internationally, [6] [7] [8] that indicators are ideally based on a clinical guideline, or-in absence of a guideline-on the best available scientific evidence with regard to quality of care. Although quality indicators are not directly linked to the clinical literacy movement that Evidence-based Medicine (EBM) originally set out to be, 9, 10 some have called indicators a "branch" of EBM 11 as they follow the same logic: clinical science can determine "what works" and parameters based on these scientific findings can form an objective standard for provider behavior. 12, 13 Quality indicators developed according to an "evidence-based approach" 6, 7 are generally reputed as a technical measuring device to evaluate the quality of care providers. this plan provides patients with better quality or accessibility," a spokesperson for hospitals in the Northern region claimed. 14 Others called insurers' plans "absolutely pretentious." 15 Hospitals and medical specialists were concerned about insurers' lack of medical-technical and practical insights into emergency care and feared for the quality of (and access to) emergency services. 16, 17 To solve the debate between insurers, hospitals, doctors, and patients about the indicators, a public knowledge institution, the National Health Care Institute (Zorginstituut Nederland), intervened.
This public knowledge institution is, amongst other things, responsible for the organization of understandable, comparable, and unambiguous information about the quality of care. A special committee of medical specialists was installed at the institute to assess the quality indicators.
In this paper, drawing from ongoing ethnographic research into proposed to centralize these services in specialized centers if the proposed quality indicators indicated that this was desirable. 27 By the end of 2013, insurers started negotiating (using said indicators), which hospitals would maintain a fully equipped emergency unit, and which hospitals would lose part of their emergency care.
A journalist reported: "In Rotterdam most complex emergency care will move to Erasmus Medical Center.
Soon four times as many people will be going there with a stroke. Five hospitals will lose stroke care." 28 A hospital director stated: "Emergency room closed, no more obstetrics, nor stroke care, no balloon angioplasty, and even broken hip operations will have to be done elsewhere". 15 The plans caused much debate in the field of emergency care. emphasized that such indicators need to be well-founded and was concerned about insurers' lack of medical-technical and practical insights into emergency care. 16, 17 NVZ criticized that insurers gave little credence to the fact that it is often difficult to predict a patient's diagnosis before he/she enters a hospital. A patient with acute abdominal pain could suffer from a wide variety of conditions ranging from gastroenteritis to abdominal aortic aneurysm. Insurance Act, reliable quality information has become a crucial ingredient for the proper functioning of the Dutch system of managed competition. 31 Quality information provides both consumers and insurers with comparable information about the performance of health care providers in order to negotiate price and quality. 32 In the years that followed the introduction of the Health Insurance Act, the health care sector developed all kinds of quality information. The multiplicity of indicators, however, actually blocked oversight and hindered informed consumer choice. 33 In response to this problem, the Minister of Health proposed to centralize the organization of quality information, and on April 1 
| Problem 1: Scope of indicators
The committee installed by the Quality Council was tasked to assess whether the indicators were "evidence-based" and adequate for mea- The committee therefore broadened the scope of the indicators.
In their final report "Excellency Demanded for Emergency Care," 34 the committee systematically supplemented indicators focusing on hospital performance with indicators regarding the organizational chain of emergency services (including, for example, regional ambulance services, triage systems, and urgent transferal). For AMI, for example, the committee included "written agreements about cooperation with partners in the organizational chain" of care for AMI. 34 By doing so, the committee emphasized the importance of the network in which an emergency patient makes a journey. It is within this network that diagnoses are made and the quality of treatments takes shape. By adding "chain agreements" to the set of quality indicators, the committee required that the quality of hospitals was not only measured by hospitals' "in-door" performance, but also measured by looking at hospitals' abilities to organize and maintain a well-functioning network in the region.
| Problem 2: Purpose of indicators
As we stated before, the committee found that most quality indicators were supported by evidence. This was, however, not the case for the so-called "optimum" volume norms proposed by insurers. The committee problematized not only the lack of evidence for insurers' volume norms, but also the purpose behind the norms. Next, we elaborate on the committee's problems with insurers' "optimum" volume norms, and why they proposed "minimum" volume norms instead.
The idea behind volume norms is that hospitals treating a bigger volume of patients get better treatment results, thus, leading to better quality and efficiency. ZN wrote in their report that abdominal aortic aneurysms and a total of 33 abdominal aortic aneurysms or more to deliver good quality care for these patients. 27 According to ZN, their "optimum" volume norms were "an estimate of what is a sensible level of emergency care concentration in order to book both quality and efficiency gains." 27 Insurers' volume norms, however, were strongly contested by field parties. According to staff members the "biggest stumbling blocks really were the volume criteria" in the debate about quality indicators.
The committee's secretary recalled that "the volume norms… that was what led to discussions," because these norms had far-reaching consequences. The chairperson to the committee explained in an interview that if insurers would have selectively contracted emergency care on the basis of these optimum volume norms, this "would have resulted in a lot of casualty departments shutting down … it would have been a ravage … lots of them would have closed because they were simply unable to fulfil the criteria."
The committee installed by the Quality Council was tasked to assess whether the volume norms were "evidence-based" and adequate for measuring the quality of emergency care. According to the committee's secretary there was "insufficient evidence" supporting these optimum norms. It became clear from our interviews, observational, and documentary research that the committee did not only have a problem with the lack of evidence for insurers' volume norms, but also with the purpose behind these "optimum" norms. A committee member explained that "based on a principle of solidarity or collectivity, you might actually think that [care] should be 'good enough' everywhere," and not necessarily "optimal."
In their final report, the committee proposed "minimum" volume norms following the advice of the scientific associations of the different fields of medical expertise. Staff members explained that scientific associations "often stipulate minimum norms" and that "these are often so low that everyone fulfils them." The purpose of minimum norms is not to optimize quality and efficiency, but to secure a minimum level of safe and reliable emergency services. Working from this idea, the committee lowered insurers' optimal volume norms to minimum norms. For CVA, for example, the committee followed the Dutch Association for Neurol- because then the survival of these people is actually much higher."
Apart from the lack of evidence supporting the optimum volume norms of ZN, the committee problematized the purpose behind optimum norms. Instead, they stipulated minimum norms, following the scientific associations of the respective field of medical expertise.
While the purpose of insurers' optimum volume norms was to organize optimal quality and efficiency in emergency care and thus optimize welfare economics, the purpose of the minimum volume norms endorsed by the committee echoed the rationale of another public responsibility: a collective duty to secure access and availability of "good-enough" emergency services for all. According to the chairperson to the committee, the problem was that insurers were acting unilaterally using standardized knowledge, while they were actually at a distance from the primary care process and had no hands-on experience of emergency care:
"This was just one party… and a party that was at a considerable distance... and because [the insurers] are at such distance, their only weapon is population data from the evidence-based medicine world... which is standardized… if someone has no hands-on experience and has never actually been to an emergency room… then these are the only available data for him to use.
But, then he forgets the knowledge sources that are somewhat harder to exploit for him, but that are very important too…' .
With "evidence-based medicine as the foundation of the quality movement," the chairperson claimed, focus has moved to "standardized protocol quality." But in applying such standards "local data are important" and collaboration in the region is necessary to exploit sources of local, tacit, and contextual knowledge. In their final report, the committee stressed that the quality indicators they proposed were to be used by professionals to discuss collectively how best to organize emergency services in the particular regions. 34 Rather than a unilateral tool for selective contracting, the committee proposed the indicators as a tool for dialogue and learning, allowing regional parties to gain insight into opportunities to improve situational quality.
| DISCUSSION
The National Health Care Institute is a public knowledge institute that is, amongst other things, lawfully tasked to organize trustworthy information about the quality of care. We studied how this body intervened in a debate about the quality of emergency care, and in that EBM's emphasis on standardized, impersonal research procedures suggests the possibility of separating "expertise from expert and knowledge from knower" and that it is possible to distill "medical truth outside the clinical encounter." 13 As a result of this uncoupling of expert and expertise, the use of statistical population research has given outsiders to health care the scientific authority to act independently in a field where-originally-they had none. 42 While outside interference into clinical practice is of all times, 43 critics 40, 41 feared that EBM's standardization of medical knowledge, would allow "strangers"-like inspectorates, policymakers, or insurers-to "regulate the field of healthcare and hold it accountable using evidence-based parameters formulated by the professions" themselves. 20 This case study reminds us that the interplay of forces between the uncritical use of standardized medical knowledge, the growing use of quality indicators, and the marketization of health care continues to require our explicit attention.
